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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of shareholder primacy has received substantial 
attention from its legions of proponents,1 its indefatigable opponents,2 
 
   Professor, Hofstra Law School. 
   Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. The authors wish to thank 
Stephen Ellis for his helpful comments. Thanks also to the participants at the 2008 Law and 
Society Association Annual Meeting, the Washington University Junior Scholars Regional 
Workshop, the Hofstra Summer Series Workshop, the 2008 Midwest Law and Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, and a faculty workshop at Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1. Shareholder primacy is generally viewed as the normative foundation for modern 
corporate law theory. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: 
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 & n.35 (2002) (―Today, most corporate law 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331070
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and even its disinterested observers.3 The notion that a corporation 
should be run in the interests of its shareholders is the theoretical 
foundation upon which modern corporate law stands.4 Almost all 
empirical study in corporate law is premised on a notion of 
shareholder primacy, and these results would lose much of their 
meaning if the theory were somehow disproved.5 Perhaps most 
importantly, shareholders do in fact have primacy of place within the 
corporation, as they alone generally have the right to elect the firm‘s 
directors.6 
Despite the importance of shareholder primacy to the American 
(and increasingly global) corporation, there is one aspect of 
shareholder primacy theory that has not received sustained scholarly 
critique. In justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, 
scholars have repeatedly turned to social choice theory—specifically, 
Arrow‘s theorem—to raise concerns about expanding the corporate 
electorate.7 Arrow‘s theorem posits that no social choice function, 
 
scholars embrace some variant of shareholder primacy.‖). In some sense, shareholder primacy 
means nothing more than shareholder control of the corporation through the power to elect 
directors. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277 (1998) 
(―The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally operate in the interests of 
shareholders. Shareholders exercise control over corporations by electing directors . . . .‖). 
However, shareholder primacy is generally seen as meaning something more: namely, that the 
corporation‘s directors should strive to run the corporation solely for the financial benefit of the 
shareholders in order to maximize social utility. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1423, 1423 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]. For that reason, it is sometimes called 
the ―shareholder wealth maximization‖ norm. Id. at 1423–25. 
 2. For some prominent examples, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE 
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA‘S NEWEST EXPORT 4–5 (2001) (arguing that shareholder wealth 
maximization keeps managers and stockholders focused on the short term); Margaret M. Blair, 
Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 
891–95 (2003) (criticizing shareholder primacy‘s focus on the maximization of short-term value); 
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1189, 1208 (2002) (dismissing several key arguments for shareholder primacy and providing 
tepid support for one). 
 3. Gordon Smith might be considered one such observer. In an article examining the 
actual effects of the norm, Smith acknowledged that ―[t]he assumption that the shareholder 
primacy norm is a major factor in the ordinary business decisions of boards of directors of 
modern, publicly traded corporations is pervasive in modern corporate law scholarship.‖ Smith, 
supra note 1, at 280. However, he argued that ―the shareholder primacy norm is nearly 
irrelevant to the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations‖ and that the norm may be 
―one of the most overrated doctrines in corporate law.‖ Id. at 279, 323. 
 4. See, e.g., Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 1, at 1423–25, 1446 (describing the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm as providing the basic logic from which modern corporate 
law rules have emerged). 
 5. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006). 
 6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–212 (2002). 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
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including any voting procedure, can simultaneously fulfill four 
conditions of democratic fairness and guarantee a transitive outcome.8 
Citing the theorem, corporate law commentators have argued that 
combining different stakeholders together into the electorate would 
result in a lack of consensus and, ultimately, the lack of coherence 
that attends intransitive social choices.9 Plagued by these voting 
pathologies, a corporation with such an electorate could even be led to 
―self-destruct.‖10 
This argument from Arrow‘s theorem, however, overestimates 
the concerns raised by the theorem about the aggregation of more 
diverse preferences. Almost any time that different viewpoints are 
converted into social choices, disparate preferences must be reconciled. 
In fact, the only way around this would be to assume that 
shareholders will never disagree—increasingly a flawed premise. 
More importantly, the argument misreads the import of the theorem—
namely, that any voting system will fail to achieve perfection and thus 
we must confront the weaknesses of the particular system at hand.11 
Ultimately, the shareholder franchise may avoid violating one of the 
conditions of Arrow‘s theorem only by violating another condition. 
This tradeoff has never been explicitly acknowledged or defended. 
Indeed, the entire argument has not received the attention it deserves. 
This Essay critically examines the use of Arrow‘s theorem to 
defend the exclusive shareholder franchise. The first Section explains 
the basic contours of the argument, surveys its influence, and 
distinguishes it from a couple of related arguments. The second 
Section, comprising the bulk of the Essay, is a sustained critique of 
the argument, which, we contend, misconstrues the import of Arrow‘s 
theorem and ignores recent work in social choice theory. Our goals are 
limited. We do not question larger issues involving the shareholder 
electorate or shareholder primacy more generally. There have been 
several other justifications offered for restrictions on the corporate 
 
 8. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); see also 
NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19–23 (1978) 
(summarizing the assumptions, conditions, and conclusions of the theorem); PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 62–65 (1986) (providing a 
concise outline of a proof of the theorem). 
 9. See infra Part I.A (discussing, inter alia, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983)). 
 10. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405. 
 11. See, e.g., FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 30–31 (stating that voting 
systems, according to the posits of social choice, ―by themselves cannot lead to intuitively 
justifiable decisions,‖ and, consequently, that corollary aspects of the decisionmaking process 
must be adjusted to achieve better group choices). 
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franchise, some of which we addressed in a recent article.12 In this 
Essay we seek only to shed light on a particular justification for the 
franchise—one that has not received the critical attention it deserves. 
I. THE USE OF ARROW‘S THEOREM IN CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
A. The Basic Argument 
One of the basic tenets of shareholder primacy is that, with few 
exceptions, shareholders alone possess the right to vote in corporate 
board elections.13 Several arguments have been advanced to support 
this proposition. One line of reasoning, for example, is that 
shareholders are the owners of the corporation and thus, ultimately, 
should be able to control corporate decisions.14 Another argument is 
that shareholders are the sole residual claimants and, as such, are in 
the best position to exercise control for the good of all corporate 
constituents.15 These claims have been advanced, fleshed out, and 
subjected to extensive critical examination.16 There is, however, one 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise that has escaped 
careful scrutiny: the argument from Arrow‘s theorem. 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem was first made by Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in their article on corporate voting17 
and later recounted in their book on the economic structure of 
corporate law.18 After presenting the residual claim argument, 
Easterbrook and Fischel provide a second reason why shareholders 
 
 12. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of 
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 445–505 (2008). 
 13. See Smith, supra note 1, at 299 (describing the development of the principle of 
shareholder primacy as deriving in part from the fact of ―the exclusive right of shareholders to 
vote‖). 
 14. For a version of this argument, see, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33, 122–26 (arguing 
that shareholders are ―the owners of the business‖ and, therefore, that the only ―social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits‖). 
 15. For a version of this argument, see, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 67–70, 91 (1996). 
 16. For a critique of the argument based on shareholder ownership, see Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007). For an extended 
critique of the argument based on shareholders as sole residual claimants, see MARGARET M. 
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 227–34 (1995). 
 17. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405. 
 18. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 70. Because the arguments in the article 
and book are identical, we will refer to the earlier article. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9. 
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alone have voting rights. Citing Kenneth Arrow‘s groundbreaking 
work, they explain: 
The voters, and the directors they elect, must determine both the objectives of the firm 
and the general methods of achieving them. It is well known, however, that when voters 
hold dissimilar preferences it is not possible to aggregate their preferences into a 
consistent system of choices. If a firm makes inconsistent choices, it is likely to self-
destruct. Consistency is possible, however, when voters commonly hold the same 
ranking of choices (or when the rankings are at least single-peaked).19 
Shareholders, as a class, have relatively homogeneous preferences 
with respect to profit maximization.20 The corporate franchise, 
therefore, is correctly limited to this particular class of like-minded 
participants.21 
So what is Arrow‘s theorem? The theorem is the centerpiece of 
a broader enterprise known as social choice theory.22 Social choice 
theory attempts to rigorously explain how individual desires are 
aggregated into social choices. More specifically, it focuses upon the 
mechanisms, known as social choice functions, used to move from 
individual preference orders to social preference orders. Most 
democratic institutions use some type of voting procedure to aggregate 
preferences (as opposed to, say, flipping a coin or asking a dictator).23 
The trustworthiness of all social choice functions, however, was cast 
into doubt with the publication of Arrow‘s theorem.24 
Arrow‘s theorem holds that no social choice function can 
simultaneously satisfy four relatively undemanding conditions of 
democratic fairness and guarantee a transitive outcome.25 The first 
 
 19. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405 (citing ARROW, supra note 8; DUNCAN 
BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958) [hereinafter BLACK, THEORY]). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. This is also, they mention, the reason why the law makes little effort to require 
firms to pursue goals other than profit maximization. Id. at 405–06. 
 22. Social choice theory and Arrow‘s theorem have mainly come into legal scholarship under 
the guise of public choice theory. For summaries of the literature, see DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38–42 (1991); Saul 
Levmore, Foreword to MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND 
COMMENTARY, at xii–xiv (1997). 
 23. See FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 16. 
 24. ARROW, supra note 8, at 22–23, 51–60. 
 25. See id. (laying out the logical foundations and conclusions for the theorem); see also 
FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 19–23 (summarizing the assumptions, conditions, 
and conclusions of the theorem); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, supra note 8, at 62–65 (1986) (providing 
a concise outline of a proof of the theorem). This Essay will borrow terminology largely from 
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 293–98 (1982). For a good, recent summary of 
the state of social choice theory and Arrow‘s theorem, see 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
WELFARE, at ix (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND WELFARE]. 
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fairness condition, nondictatorship, demands that no single person‘s 
preference order determines the social preference order regardless of 
what others prefer.26 The second condition, Pareto efficiency, requires 
that if everyone prefers one alternative to another, then the social 
choice procedure must reproduce that ordering.27 The third condition, 
universal domain, demands that the social choice procedure works 
with any possible set of individual preference orders.28 The final 
fairness condition, independence from irrelevant alternatives, requires 
that the introduction of a new ―irrelevant‖ alternative into the 
preference profile does not affect the relative orderings of the other 
alternatives.29 The logical condition of transitivity guarantees that the 
social choice function will produce a complete and transitive social 
preference order: if A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A must be 
preferred to C.30 The contrary—an intransitive preference order where 
A is preferred to B, B to C, and C to A—is referred to as a voting cycle 
and indicates that the social choice function is unable to declare a 
winner, at least one that is meaningful.31 
As applied to corporate voting, then, the argument from 
Arrow‘s theorem is as follows. The theorem tells us there is no 
corporate voting procedure that meets the four fairness conditions and 
at the same time guarantees a consistent (i.e., acyclical) outcome. 
Something—either one of the fairness conditions or a guaranteed 
transitive outcome—must yield. For example, adhering to the 
condition of universal domain by allowing those with dissimilar (or, at 
a minimum, multi-peaked) preferences to vote in corporate elections 
could result in inconsistent corporate decisionmaking, which, in turn, 
would cause a corporation, in Easterbrook and Fischel‘s terms, to 
―self-destruct.‖32 Relaxing the condition of universal domain by 
restricting the vote to a class of participants with similar individual 
 
 26. RIKER, supra note 25, at 295. 
 27. Id. at 117–18. 
 28. Id. at 116–17, 297. 
 29. Id. at 118. The term ―irrelevant‖ is not pejorative, but instead refers to an alternative 
outside the set from which a group must choose that does not alter the desirability of the other 
alternatives relative to each other. Grant M. Hayden, The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A 
Defense of the Voting Rights Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87, 101 (1999). 
 30. See RIKER, supra note 25, at 119, 297. 
 31. See Hayden, supra note 29, at 101–02 (describing intransitivity as a voting cycle and 
explaining the problems with a system displaying this characteristic); Grant M. Hayden, Note, 
Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) 
[hereinafter Hayden, Note] (defining intransitivity and stating that it may in essence lead to 
dictatorial power being exercised in a social choice function by way of agenda control). 
 32. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405. 
ARROW ARTICLE 6/2/2009 10:01 AM 
200x] THE EXCLUSIVE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE 107 
preference profiles would avoid such an outcome.33 Shareholders, 
given their homogeneous interest in profit maximization, are just such 
a class.34 
B. The Influence of the Argument from Arrow’s Theorem 
This argument has been quite influential in the decades since 
its initial formulation. Henry Hansmann uses it to argue against 
allowing every group of stakeholders to have representation on a 
corporate board of directors: ―[B]ecause the participants are likely to 
have radically diverging interests, making everybody an owner 
threatens to increase the costs of collective decision making 
enormously.‖35 Among these costs: the possibility of a voting cycle, 
which ―increases as preferences among the electorate become more 
heterogeneous.‖36 Such cycles, Hansmann explains, would lead to 
repeated alteration of the firm‘s policies and a grant of ―extraordinary 
power‖ to those in control of the voting agenda.37 
The argument appears to give particularly powerful 
ammunition to those arguing against codetermination, or employee 
board representation. Gregory Dow, for example, worries, as per 
Arrow‘s theorem, that employee representatives introduce the 
possibility of ―voting . . . pathologies.‖38 He explains, ―[U]nder most 
proposals for employee representation, the board would need to 
reconcile a far wider range of conflicting interests‖ than when the 
board represents only shareholders.39 Merely expanding the franchise 
to include this one additional class of constituents, then, is enough to 
trigger the damaging intransitive outcomes.40 
This argument for exclusive shareholder franchise has even 
been cited by scholars whose vision of corporate governance does not 
otherwise demand it. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, for example, 
 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 405–06. 
 35. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 44 (1996). 
 36. Id. at 41–42. 
 37. Id. at 42. 
 38. Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 
1997). 
 39. Id. Though he relies on Arrow‘s theorem as part of a general argument against opening 
up corporate elections to additional constituencies, Dow seems most worried about cycling at the 
level of board decisionmaking. See id. 
 40. See, e.g., id. 
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advocate a ―team production model‖ of corporate law,41 where the 
corporate boards ―exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to 
protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the 
corporate ‗team,‘ including shareholders, managers, rank and file 
employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.‖42 When it 
comes to determining the proper board electorate, however, Blair and 
Stout take a more traditional line, arguing that the franchise should 
probably be limited to shareholders alone.43 Their first argument for 
this proposition? ―[P]lurality voting by shareholders who have a 
relatively homogeneous interest in maximizing share value may 
exhibit fewer pathologies and be less conducive to rent-seeking than a 
vote taken among many competing constituencies with conflicting 
interests.‖44 The perceived power of the argument from Arrow‘s 
theorem, then, is such that a fairly wide variety of corporate scholars 
have made use of it. 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem has been quite influential. 
The durability of the argument appears to come from the strength of 
the theorem itself, which, at this point, has withstood scrutiny for over 
half a century.45 Indeed, the strength and power of the theorem may 
be the reason why this argument for exclusive shareholder voting is 
frequently raised but rarely examined, as if invocation of the theorem 
is all that is required. Before turning to the task of critically 
examining the argument, however, we must distinguish it from two 
related arguments. 
C. Two Related but Distinct Arguments 
1. The Argument from Politics 
First, the argument from Arrow‘s theorem is different (and 
more powerful) than the argument for exclusive shareholder franchise 
 
 41. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). In their model, people who hope to profit from team production give up 
some of their rights to the corporation and, in return, the corporation coordinates the activities of 
the team members and allocates the resulting production in a way that minimizes shirking and 
rent-seeking. Id. at 250–51. 
 42. Id. at 253. 
 43. Id. at 312–15. 
 44. Id. at 313. This is not, by the way, their only argument for this conclusion. Id. at 314–
15. 
 45. See Kotaro Suzumura, Introduction to 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 
supra note 25, at 1, 18–25 (describing decades of work attacking Arrow‘s theorem, but reiterating 
its continued vitality). 
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based on mere disagreements among constituents or the board 
members they elect. The latter, which we will call the argument from 
politics, is that a board representing more diverse constituents will 
come to agreement on corporate decisions less readily than a board 
representing a single class of constituents. A board may represent 
more diverse interests when an election has been opened up to more 
than one corporate constituency or when certain constituencies are 
allowed to elect their own board representatives (like the German 
codetermination model). Either way, the resulting process, the 
argument goes, would be prone to disagreements, internal bickering, 
information asymmetries, and the like that would make for less 
efficient corporate decisionmaking. The argument from politics, then, 
draws on a range of difficulties (other than lurking Arrovian 
intransitivities) in collective decisionmaking introduced by voters with 
more heterogeneous interests. 
Many corporate law theorists have advanced the argument 
from politics. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, for example, 
argue for an exclusive shareholder franchise because stakeholder 
representation would lead to more cumbersome decision processes.46 
Stephen Bainbridge makes a similar point largely on the basis of 
Arrow‘s models of consensus and authority decisionmaking,47 
explaining that differing interests and levels of information would bog 
down corporate decisionmaking.48 In a related vein, Blair and Stout 
ask us to ―[i]magine the chaos and politicking likely to attend an 
election in which a firm‘s creditors, executives, rank-and-file 
employees, and other stakeholders with unique and often conflicting 
interests could vote on their favored candidates.‖49 It is at times 
difficult to discern which argument for exclusive shareholder franchise 
is being advanced.50 Bainbridge, for example, concentrates on the 
argument from politics, but at times refers to more generalized 
 
 46. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in 
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 33, 64 (Reinier 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 447–49 (2001). 
 47. The arguments are drawn, somewhat confusingly for our purposes, from Kenneth 
Arrow‘s other work on institutional design, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
 48. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 
J. CORP. L. 657, 725 (1996). 
 49. Blair & Stout, supra note 41, at 313. 
 50. This is certainly understandable because both arguments are related to potential 
breakdowns in collective decisionmaking. This is not to say that the authors are conflating the 
two arguments, but just that it is difficult to see whether and to what degree they are relying 
upon the argument from Arrow‘s theorem when discussing reasons for limiting the franchise to 
shareholders. 
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worries about collective decisionmaking that may include the 
possibility of Arrovian intransitivities.51 
We take care to separate the two arguments not only because 
they are analytically distinct, but also because the argument from 
politics is far less powerful than the one from Arrow‘s theorem. The 
argument from politics postulates that a more diverse board electorate 
may have difficulty choosing board members, or that a board 
composed of members representing more diverse constituencies may 
not reach consensus as easily (or at all) as a board representing those 
with more homogeneous interests. This may be so, but the difficulties 
that animate the argument from politics may, at least theoretically, be 
reduced or eliminated by tinkering with institutional design features. 
For example, boards traditionally follow internal procedures requiring 
majority votes, with the chair having tie-breaking authority.52 In the 
end, one can always design a procedure for forcing a vote and reaching 
a decision on any particular issue—there may be winners and losers, 
but a decision will be made that is based on voter preferences. (Indeed, 
board diversity, and the argument and deliberation that go with it, 
may actually change people‘s preferences. And the fact that voters do 
not always agree—and may squabble along the way—is, of course, the 
reason we have voting procedures to begin with.) 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem involves a more 
fundamental objection to heterogeneous board electorates. Unlike the 
argument from politics, the theorem applies to all social choice 
procedures. This means that there is no independent mechanism of 
checking the reliability of an election outcome in any particular case. 
Any checking mechanism would need to explicitly or implicitly equate 
voter preferences with social choices and thus would be vulnerable to 
violations of the same set of the theorem‘s conditions that it is 
designed to test.53 This is part of the reason the theorem is so 
devastating, and it explains why some commentators argue that the 
theorem makes the very notion of a popular will meaningless at some 
level.54 The argument from Arrow‘s theorem cannot be overcome by 
simply tinkering with the decision procedures. 
 
 51. See Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 667 n.51, 725 n.409. 
 52. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2002) (―The vote of the majority of the directors 
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors 
unless the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws shall require a vote of a greater number.‖). 
 53. See Hayden, Note, supra note 31, at 305. 
 54. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 8, at 56–57 (discussing the Condorcet paradox and its 
argument that journalistic shorthand such as ―the public interest‖ or ―community goals‖ has no 
proper place in any adequate theory of political processes); RIKER, supra note 25, at 119. 
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Further, the consequences of the theorem itself are, if 
anything, understated by Easterbrook and Fischel. In their version of 
the argument, expanding the corporate board electorate would result 
in ―inconsistent‖ firm choices.55 But the true impact of the theorem 
goes beyond choices that are merely inconsistent. One famous 
corollary of Arrow‘s theorem—the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem—
tells us that all nondictatorial voting schemes are subject to strategic 
manipulation.56 In the presence of intransitive social preference 
orders, the social choice may depend upon the order in which 
alternatives are presented to the electorate—control of the agenda is 
tantamount to control of the outcomes. This is, in part, what worries 
Hansmann about the possibility of intransitive results.57 The 
potential, then, is not only for inconsistent firm decisions, but also for 
decisions that may be manipulated by whoever sets the agenda 
(which, in this setting, would most likely be the board itself). The 
argument from Arrow‘s theorem, then, is distinct from and more 
powerful than the argument from politics. 
2. The Argument for Absolute Delegation 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem for exclusive shareholder 
franchise may also be distinguished from a similar argument for the 
absolute delegation rule in corporate law. The absolute delegation rule 
describes the fact that shareholders typically lack the power to 
directly participate in a firm‘s business decisionmaking; that power is 
instead delegated to corporate managers.58 One argument advanced 
for this institutional arrangement is based on Arrow‘s theorem. 
Jeffrey Gordon argues that direct shareholder control over day-to-day 
business decisionmaking through, say, an initiative process, would 
greatly increase the risk of cyclical outcomes because the risk of 
intransitivities grows as the number of voters and alternatives 
increase.59 This, as per Arrow‘s theorem and its corollaries, would lead 
 
 55. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405. One assumes this means choices that are 
inconsistent with each other, as opposed to inconsistent with some hypothetically ―correct‖ choice 
(which, as we now know, would not be possible to discern). 
 56. Or subject to dictatorial control, a state of affairs that is no better in this context. See 
Alan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Rules: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587, 587 
(1973); Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and 
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. ECON. 
THEORY 187, 188 (1975). 
 57. See HANSMANN, supra note 35, at 41–42. 
 58. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic 
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 351–52 (1991). 
 59. Id. at 359–60. 
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either to inconsistent corporate decisions or to the manipulation of the 
corporate decisions by shareholders interested in private gain.60 In 
either case, shareholder initiative of this sort would lead to a less 
productive corporation—hence the need to delegate such authority to 
management.61 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem with respect to exclusive 
shareholder franchise has much in common with this argument for 
absolute delegation. Both trade on the possibility that Arrovian 
intransitivities will result in inconsistent or manipulable corporate 
decisions. There are, however, some differences, the principal one 
being that the alternatives are candidates for board membership in 
one case and specific business decisions in the other. The specter of 
cycling may not loom as large with respect to board elections because 
there are typically fewer candidates up for any particular seat on the 
board than there are possible directions to take a business. Board 
elections may be held much less frequently than a system of direct 
shareholder initiatives on day-to-day business decisions, further 
reducing the opportunities for cycling.62 And, more generally, the 
argument for an exclusive shareholder franchise depends upon a more 
complicated (and tenuously connected) series of events to get from 
inconsistent board membership choices to inconsistent corporate 
decisions, a relationship that is more direct in the argument for 
absolute delegation. 
Thus, some of the arguments that follow—for example, those 
that make use of the distinction between voting on board members 
and voting on firm decisions—would not apply with any force to this 
related argument for absolute delegation.63 Other arguments, 
however, may have some application to both. For example, the 
arguments below that involve balancing the likelihood of 
intransitivities in the corporate setting with the costs associated with 
limiting the franchise may also apply, with some variation, to the 
argument for absolute delegation. That said, the focus of this Essay is 
on the strength of the argument from Arrow‘s theorem as it applies to 
restricting the franchise to shareholders; the degree to which some of 
our arguments apply to the related arguments for absolute delegation 
is left for another day. 
 
 60. See id. at 359–63. 
 61. See id. at 363. 
 62. Id. at 373. 
 63. Indeed, Gordon makes some of these distinctions between the cycling problem with 
initiatives and the potential cycling problem that may arise in board elections with a more 
heterogeneous shareholder electorate. See id. at 372–73. 
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II. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ARROW‘S THEOREM 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem for exclusive shareholder 
voting is not compelling. This does not stem from a vulnerability in 
the theorem itself, but instead from its application to the social choice 
function in question—corporate board voting. That application has 
been undertheorized by those who make the argument and taken as 
an article of faith by those who rely upon it. The remainder of this 
Essay is devoted to a critical appraisal of the argument. 
A. Shareholder Heterogeneity 
Initially, we note that the premise of the argument—that 
shareholders have homogeneous preferences with respect to wealth 
maximization—has come under increasing scrutiny. Shareholders, it 
turns out, have interests that diverge along a number of dimensions. 
Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy recently focused attention upon the 
problems caused by equity derivatives, which carve up various 
shareholder rights into discrete financial securities.64 But there are 
many other ways in which shareholders fail to share common 
interests.65 Some shareholders may be in a control group, and others 
may not.66 Employee and pension-holding shareholders have different 
interests from non-employee shareholders.67 And even traditional 
shareholders may have different time horizons for wealth 
maximization that cannot be costlessly equalized through existing 
financial instruments.68 Martin and Partnoy conclude, ―It is simply 
not true that the ‗preferences of [shareholders] are likely to be similar 
if not identical.‘ ‖69 
The presence of heterogeneous shareholder preferences 
undercuts a crucial assumption of the argument from Arrow‘s 
theorem. But even if shareholder preferences are not identical, 
proponents of the argument may be able to salvage their position by 
showing that the preferences are sufficiently similar to make the 
argument work. If, for example, shareholder preferences are more 
homogeneous than the preferences of those of other corporate 
 
 64. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778–81. 
 65. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 12, at 477–99 (cataloguing the ways in which 
shareholder interests diverge). 
 66. See id. at 477–80. 
 67. See id. at 486–88. 
 68. See id. at 492–94. 
 69. Martin & Partnoy, supra note 64, at 778 (quoting Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, 
at 405). 
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constituencies or, at a minimum, than the preference profile of a 
combined corporate electorate, then there may be some support for a 
weakened version of the argument from Arrow‘s theorem. As we 
discuss below, this will, in part, depend upon the exact nature of the 
asserted homogeneity. But in any case, there may be enough left of the 
premise of shareholder homogeneity to examine the strength of the 
argument itself. 
B. Shareholder Preferences over Candidates 
Even with the assumption of shareholder homogeneity, there 
are several reasons why Arrow‘s theorem fails to provide a suitable 
foundation for restricting corporate voting to shareholders alone. 
Shareholder agreement on the goal of wealth maximization, even if 
true, does not indicate agreement on how best to achieve that goal.70 
Shareholders may, and often do, wildly disagree over the proper 
course of action for their corporation. 
Indeed, it is not at all clear that shareholder preferences with 
respect to methods are more likely, as Easterbrook and Fischel argue, 
to be single-peaked or otherwise value restricted. Take, for example, 
three groups of shareholders (S1, S2, and S3), each of which owns a 
third of the voting shares of Yahoo!. Let us also suppose that Yahoo! 
has three sets of strategic opportunities in front of it: it could merge 
with Microsoft, it could set up a strategic alliance with Microsoft, or it 
could set up a strategic alliance with Google. Different shareholders 
are likely to have different preferences for each of these options. These 
preferences could be described as: merge with Microsoft (mm), set up 
an alliance with Microsoft (am), or set up an alliance with Google (ag). 
The first two groups, S1 and S2, believe that Yahoo! is floundering and 
needs to set up a relationship with either Microsoft or Google in order 
to thrive. The first group, S1, thinks a great deal of Microsoft and 
believes a merger or, to a lesser extent, a contractual relationship with 
them will generate the most profitable synergies. Thus, S1 most 
prefers mm, followed by am, then ag.71 Group S2 believes the profit 
potential is greater with Google, and hence most prefers ag, followed 
 
 70. See Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 665 (discussing various explanations, such as 
investment time and tax bracket, for disagreement over how best to achieve the goal of wealth 
maximization). If there was complete agreement, there would, of course, be no reason to have 
board elections in the first place because we could just ask one of the shareholders to report the 
shared preference ranking. 
 71. If the merger was a cash-out merger offering the highest current cash value of the three 
options, this preference set would correlate with shareholders interested in short-term profit 
maximization. 
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by mm, then am. The third group of shareholders, S3, slightly prefers 
Microsoft over Google, but greatly values Yahoo!‘s unique corporate 
culture and believes that the resulting culture clash with either of the 
potential partners would overwhelm any productive synergies from an 
alliance or, worse, a merger. This group also believes Google would be 
more aggressive in a partnership than Microsoft would be. Thus, S3 
most prefers am, followed by ag, then mm. The resulting preference 
profile is: 
 
S1 : mmPamPag 
 
S2 :  agPmmPam 
 
S3 :  amPagPmm 
 
This profile is not single-peaked or otherwise value restricted. It is, 
instead, an instantiation of the Condorcet paradox and yields the 
voting cycle mmPamPagPmm. 
At the level of general methods of achieving corporate wealth-
maximization goals, then, there is no reason to believe that 
shareholders are uniquely situated to have preference profiles that are 
single-peaked or otherwise domain restricted. In the Yahoo! example, 
it was quite simple, given a plausible division in shareholder 
preferences along two dimensions—their relative feelings about the 
two potential partners and their views on Yahoo!‘s corporate culture—
to generate a preference profile that returned an intransitive 
outcome.72 This was true despite the fact that all three groups of 
shareholders wanted to maximize profits. Given the multiple 
dimensions of most significant business decisions, shareholder 
preferences are not particularly likely to fall into patterns that ensure 
transitive outcomes. 
More specifically, even if shareholders were to agree on the 
direction for their corporation, they may well have very different ideas 
about which director candidate(s) would best effectuate it. This 
additional degree of detachment is less likely to play a role with 
respect to significant corporate decisions, where slates of board 
candidates are elected precisely to effectuate a particular decision. But 
 
 72. This is not to say that it would be difficult to put together a scenario in which an 
expanded corporate electorate (that included constituencies other than shareholders) had a 
preference profile that led to an intransitive outcome. The point here is that devising such a 
scenario with shareholders alone is relatively easy, even assuming an identical interest in wealth 
maximization, and the burden is on those who advance the argument from Arrow‘s theorem that 
there is a marked difference in the probability of acyclic outcomes with an expanded electorate. 
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it would add a layer of complexity when translating agreement on 
more mundane aspects of a corporation‘s direction into preferences on 
board candidates. The proponents of the argument from Arrow‘s 
theorem never make clear why underlying agreement on profit 
maximization, or even upon the method for achieving that goal, 
generally makes it more likely that shareholder preferences are 
single-peaked with respect to director candidates. Because Arrow‘s 
theorem operates on the level of individual preference orders over an 
array of alternatives (here, director candidates), agreement on the 
general goals or methods of the corporation does little to ensure that a 
particular voting system for board membership will be free from 
Arrovian intransitivities. 
C. The Inevitability of Imperfection: Understanding Arrow’s Theorem 
1. Making Choices Among Arrow‘s Conditions 
Even if shareholder homogeneity with respect to profit 
maximization reduced the incidence of cycles in corporate director 
elections, that is not necessarily a powerful argument in favor of 
allowing only shareholders to vote. Arrow‘s theorem demonstrates 
that no social choice function can simultaneously fulfill the four 
conditions of democratic fairness and one condition of logicality, but it 
says nothing about which condition should be sacrificed when 
designing a voting structure. That decision depends on an assessment 
of the costs associated with sacrificing one of the conditions of 
democratic fairness and, on the other side, the practical likelihood and 
costs associated with intransitive outcomes. And those who use 
Arrow‘s theorem to argue in favor of restricting voting rights to 
shareholders have not made the case for their choice of conditions to 
sacrifice. 
Because Arrow‘s theorem applies to all social choice functions, 
including all corporate voting systems, we know that a voting system 
where shareholders alone may cast votes must violate one of the 
conditions of democratic fairness or transitivity.73 And, as mentioned 
above, it does: restricting voting rights to shareholders because of 
their purported agreement with each other is a straightforward 
violation of the condition of universal domain. That condition, 
remember, demands that a voting procedure work with every 
 
 73. See Hayden, Note, supra note 31, at 299–304 (providing examples of how the Condorcet 
method, the amendment procedure, the Borda count, and cumulative voting systems all fall prey 
to Arrow‘s theorem). 
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permutation of voter preferences over a set of alternatives. And, like 
the other fundamental requirements of democratic fairness, universal 
domain is relatively uncontroversial. Giving up this condition by 
restricting individual preference orders runs counter to a fundamental 
democratic principle: people should not be declared ineligible to vote 
because of their preferences. It also runs counter to a fundamental 
principal of standard economics that we take people‘s preferences as 
they come. 
And, to be clear, this is not one of those situations where people 
with an interest in an election, to whom we would otherwise extend 
the right to vote, just naturally happen to have preferences that, 
collectively, do not produce intransitivities.74 In those situations, the 
condition of universal domain is not sacrificed by denying anyone the 
right to vote from the outset. Because the voters encounter no prior 
restraint on their preference orders, the principal justification for 
universal domain—the immorality of denying the ballot to people with 
certain preference orders—is not implicated. Sacrificing universal 
domain in such situations sacrifices very little. Here, however, the 
argument is that people other than shareholders, even if they have an 
interest in an election, should be denied the right to vote from the 
outset because they have preference orders that, when combined with 
those of the shareholders, may produce a voting cycle. The argument 
thus implicates the full weight of the justification behind the condition 
of universal domain. 
Given the obvious democratic cost of disenfranchising 
interested voters because of their opinions, the argument that Arrow‘s 
theorem inevitably leads us to restrict voting rights to shareholders is 
not compelling. If one is willing to sacrifice universal domain, why not 
further restrict voting rights to those who agree on the precise 
direction that the corporation should go, or, better yet, on the slate of 
directors to take it there? After all, that kind of agreement, unlike a 
shared goal of profit maximization, may actually guarantee a 
transitive outcome. Or why not sacrifice one of the other conditions of 
democratic fairness? Restricting the vote to shareholders is certainly 
not the only social choice procedure that may eliminate the possibility 
of cyclical results—one could also have a system where the person 
 
 74. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 29, at 109–32 (arguing that the level of spectrum 
agreement required in Voting Rights Act claims, while not complete, is sufficient to reduce the 
incidence of cycling to near zero); Hayden, Note, supra note 31, at 312 (arguing that the racial 
bloc voting requirements of certain claims under the Voting Rights Act may represent a case of 
―naturally occurring‖ spectrum agreement that decreases the incidence of cycling). As will be 
discussed infra, many groups of people associated through a polity or a corporation may have 
sufficiently common reference points to greatly reduce the incidence of intransitivities. 
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reading this Essay chooses the directors (which, despite the obvious 
upside, violates nondictatorship) or a system where the directors are 
randomly chosen (which violates Pareto efficiency). There is 
something weird about ―solving‖ the problem of preference 
aggregation by deciding not to listen to certain people. But, more 
broadly, the point here is that the case for sacrificing universal 
domain in this instance has not been made, and we‘re really just left 
with the question we started with: should voting rights be restricted to 
shareholders? 
2. The Likelihood of Intransitive Results 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem is all the more surprising 
given that it does not analyze the likelihood or cost of intransitive 
results. As it turns out, the likelihood of cyclical outcomes, even when 
voting is not limited to shareholders, is probably quite small. And the 
cost of such outcomes, when they do occur, is probably negligible (and 
certainly not likely to cause corporations to ―self-destruct‖). This is 
true for several reasons. 
Initially, we note that empirical observations across a broad 
range of voting mechanisms have failed to discover the large number 
of intransitivities initially predicted by social choice theory.75 This is 
probably because those early predictions were based on the 
assumption that all individual preference orders were equally likely to 
occur in a preference profile—that individual preference orders were 
somehow randomly distributed.76 With such preference profiles, for 
example, in a large election with as few as six alternatives, almost 
one-third of the possible preference profiles produce intransitive 
outcomes.77 Without this assumption of an impartial culture, however, 
the predicted frequency of cycles varies tremendously, and there are 
several aspects of real-world preference profiles that greatly increase 
the likelihood of transitive outcomes. 
 
 75. See Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and 
Clarification, 51 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986) (explaining that ―empirical observations of a wide 
variety of actual collective decisionmaking processes indicate that cyclical majorities are very 
rare‖); Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: 
Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1993) (noting that 
cycles are much harder to find than early social choice models had predicted). 
 76. See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution for the 
Probability of the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. SCI. 317, 321 (1968). 
 77. See id. at 322 & tbl.2. 
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One feature of a preference profile that ensures transitive 
outcomes is something loosely referred to as spectrum agreement.78 
Spectrum agreement is a domain restriction that occurs when all 
voters array their preferences along a common spectrum.79 This 
should not be confused with agreement on the order of those 
alternatives. To make this point clear, take an extreme example of a 
case where all the individuals rank candidates for corporation director 
based on whether the candidates promise to maximize profits (one end 
of the spectrum) or to minimize profits (the other end of the spectrum). 
There are three candidates running for office—a profit maximizer (p), 
a wastrel (w), and some evenhanded chap in between (m). Voters who 
want to maximize profits will most prefer candidate p and least prefer 
candidate w, with m somewhere in between. Conversely, voters who 
want to throw money away will most prefer w, followed by m, with p 
last. Moderate voters will have preference orders of m-p-w or m-w-p, 
depending on whether they are closer to the profit or wastrel side of 
the spectrum. Although these voters rank the candidates in different 
orders, their preferences can all be aligned along the same spectrum. 
And no voter would rank the moderate candidate last, as agreement 
on the spectrum precludes such an ordering. 
This type of spectrum agreement is important because it is a 
sufficient condition of transitivity.80 When all voters align the 
alternatives on a common spectrum, a simple majoritarian voting 
procedure will produce a transitive social ordering.81 This is true 
despite the fact that the voters vehemently disagree on the relative 
merits of the candidates;82 indeed, the example included voters who 
wanted profits maximized and those who wanted profits minimized. 
But so long as there is agreement on the spectrum, an acyclic result is 
guaranteed. 
Spectrum agreement of this sort may be described in a variety 
of ways, all of which constitute a sufficient condition for transitive 
outcomes. For example, a group of individual preference profiles may 
be ―single-peaked‖ if there is a single horizontal ordering (a spectrum) 
where every one of the individual orders may be arranged so that each 
has a most-desired alternative and prefers other alternatives less as 
 
 78. See Hayden, supra note 29, at 107–08; Hayden, Note, supra note 31, at 306–07. 
Although the term ―spectrum agreement‖ seems to imply some express understanding between 
voters, it is enough that voter preferences may be arrayed on a common continuum, regardless of 
whether the voters agreed ahead of time or, indeed, even knew about the agreement. 
 79. Hayden, supra note 29, at 107. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See RIKER, supra note 25, at 123–28. 
 82. Id. at 126. 
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they are further from his ideal point.83 The outcome of a simple 
majority vote is guaranteed to be transitive, and the winner will be 
the alternative closest to the ideal point of the median voter.84 The 
same sort of outcome is true of profiles that are, analogously, single-
caved or polarized.85 
More broadly, domain restrictions where a preference profile is 
―value restricted‖ are a sufficient condition of transitive outcomes.86 A 
triple of alternatives is value restricted if at least one alternative is 
never first, middle, or last in every individual‘s preference order.87 The 
example above—with the profit maximizer, wastrel, and moderate—
involved a preference profile that was both single-peaked (on the array 
of profit maximizing or minimizing) and value restricted (candidate m 
was never ranked last). 
One potential drawback to these various indicia of spectrum 
agreement is that they must be complete in order to guarantee 
transitive outcomes.88 If, for example, even one voter in an otherwise 
value-restricted preference profile ranks an alternative where she 
shouldn‘t (the rank order that made the profile value restricted to 
begin with), the guarantee of a transitive outcome disappears.89 For 
this reason, one early commentator explained that ―the various 
equilibrium conditions for majority rule are incompatible with even a 
very modest degree of heterogeneity of tastes, and for most purposes 
are probably not significantly less restrictive than the extreme 
condition of complete unanimity of individual preferences.‖90 Perhaps, 
 
 83. See BLACK, THEORY, supra note 19, at 19–25 (discussing proofs of theorems and 
examples involving single-peaked preference curves); DUNCAN BLACK & R.A. NEWING, 
COMMITTEE DECISIONS WITH COMPLEMENTARY VALUATION 19–28 (1951) (discussing group voting 
on two separate issues and proving there can be at most one majority decision); Duncan Black, 
On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 23–24 & fig.1 (1948) 
(explaining and depicting a single-peaked preference profile for a voter with one most desired 
alternative). 
 84. See BLACK, THEORY, supra note 19, at 125–29. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Amartya K. Sen, A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions, 34 ECONOMETRICA 
491, 492–95 (1966). 
 87. Id. at 492. 
 88. See Feld & Grofman, supra note 75, at 72–73 (―[I]f even one individual has non-single-
peaked preferences then there can be a paradox of cyclical majorities.‖); Richard G. Niemi, 
Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 488, 488 (1969) 
(finding that for ―majority voting [to] yield a transitive social ordering . . . . the preference 
ordering of every individual must be single-peaked‖). 
 89. See Hayden, supra note 29, at 125–26 (providing an example of a preference profile 
where sixteen of seventeen preference orders are single-peaked yet a majority vote produces an 
intransitive outcome). 
 90. Gerald H. Kramer, On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule, 41 
ECONOMETRICA 285, 285 (1973). 
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then, we should still be wary of the possibility of cyclical outcomes in 
our voting procedures. 
Fortunately, later work in social choice theory has shown that 
the likelihood of transitive outcomes does not wholly depend upon the 
assurance of complete spectrum agreement. Instead, much lesser 
degrees of voter homogeneity may be sufficient. Richard Niemi, for 
example, proved that a larger proportion of single-peaked or otherwise 
value-restricted preference orders increased the probability of an 
acyclic result.91 This is especially true, counterintuitively, as the 
number of voters increases.92 His result was confirmed by later studies 
using other measures of social homogeneity.93 And it was supported by 
other work that looked at preference profiles as a whole, which 
concluded that society often acts in a way that is more ideological than 
the individuals that compose it.94 Overall, it turns out that ―[t]he 
[voting] paradox can be very satisfactorily avoided if common frames 
of reference are widespread but far less than unanimous.‖95 
There is a range of political, economic, and sociological reasons 
why members of societies will exhibit a large degree of spectrum 
agreement. Most democracies, for example, require a degree of 
consensus at their formation, and common socialization may further 
shape individual frames of reference,96 which may explain why there 
are so few observed cycles in the political arena. Those reasons would 
apply with particular force in corporate ventures, which, after all, 
involve participation in an organization designed to facilitate certain 
kinds of economic activity. The various categories of people interested 
in the organization may disagree about many aspects of its 
governance, but they will very likely share the common frames of 
reference that lead to transitive election results. There is reason to 
believe, in other words, that the number of intransitivities in 
 
 91. See Niemi, supra note 88, at 488. 
 92. Id. at 493–94; see also Hayden, supra note 29, at 127–28 (discussing Niemi‘s findings). 
This is counterintuitive because the likelihood of transitive outcomes decreases as you increase 
the number of individuals in a profile assuming an impartial culture. See Niemi, supra note 88, 
at 493–94. 
 93. See, e.g., Peter C. Fishburn, Voter Concordance, Simple Majorities, and Group Decision 
Methods, 18 BEHAV. SCI. 364, 371–72 (1973); Dean Jamison & Edward Luce, Social Homogeneity 
and the Probability of Intransitive Majority Rule, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 79, 84–86 (1972); see also 
Hayden, supra note 29, at 128–30 (discussing these two studies). 
 94. See Feld & Grofman, supra note 75, at 73–79 (extending Niemi‘s result and finding that 
a social preference order will be transitive if there is more than a fifty percent probability that a 
randomly chosen individual would align the alternatives along one existing continuum); see also 
Hayden, supra note 29, at 130–31 (discussing Feld and Grofman‘s findings). 
 95. Niemi, supra note 88, at 494. 
 96. See FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
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corporate director elections, even when the electorate is expanded, is 
likely to be quite low. In any case, the proponents of this argument 
have not made the positive case for the proposition that expanding the 
corporate electorate will, in fact, significantly increase the risk of 
intransitive outcomes when compared with an election restricted to 
shareholders alone. 
Indeed, it may well be that expanding the corporate electorate 
to include at least one other group of stakeholders may further reduce 
the expected number of intransitivities in board elections. Take, for 
example, a system of codetermination where both shareholders and 
employees have the right to vote on candidates for board membership 
in the same election. That electorate may very well view candidates 
for board membership through the common lens of whether the 
candidates are friendlier to the interests of capital or labor. There 
would, in other words, be the sort of spectrum agreement that 
increases the likelihood of a transitive outcome in any given board 
election. There would not, of course, be agreement on the candidates 
themselves, as members of each group would likely favor candidates 
more friendly to their interests. And there would not be any guarantee 
that the resultant board would make better decisions (though at least 
the board would represent a greater number of stakeholders in the 
enterprise). But if, as here, the entire concern is the destructive 
possibilities of voting cycles, introducing a second set of voters may 
polarize voter preferences over the array of candidates in a way that 
greatly increases the chance of a transitive outcome. Thus, 
Easterbrook and Fischel are not merely wrong to pronounce it ―well 
known . . . that when voters hold dissimilar preferences it is not 
possible to aggregate their preferences into a consistent system of 
choices‖97—they may have it exactly backwards. Expanding the 
corporate electorate to include constituencies whose interests are 
clearly oppositional reduces the chances of a multi-peaked social 
preference profile. The argument from Arrow‘s theorem may actually 
be turned on its head as an argument in favor of expanding the 
electorate to include at least one other significant group of 
stakeholders. 
The prospect of a corporate board election with multiple voting 
constituencies brings to light another flaw in the argument from 
Arrow‘s theorem—the assumption that the entire expanded electorate 
would necessarily be voting in a single election. It is much more likely 
that, in an expanded electorate, each group would be allocated a 
certain number of board representatives. In other words, there would 
 
 97. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 405. 
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be a prior decision about how many representatives each group had a 
right to elect, and then each group would hold its own elections.  
Roughly speaking, this is how the German codetermination system is 
set up. And the argument from Arrow‘s theorem would then come 
down to showing that other constituencies are more likely than 
shareholders to have suitably domain-restricted preference profiles (a 
dubious prospect given recent work on the diversity of shareholder 
preferences) or to claiming that the argument really is about cycling at 
the level of board decisionmaking, not candidate elections. 
3. The Consequences of Intransitive Results 
Finally, the case has not been made that the occasional 
intransitivity in corporate board elections would do much harm to an 
organization, and certainly not that it would cause a firm to make 
―inconsistent choices‖ that would lead it to ―self-destruct.‖98 Initially, a 
large proportion of intransitive results are middle or bottom cycles 
that still allow us to pick clear winners despite producing cycles 
involving lower-ranked alternatives.99 Thus, the estimates of the 
number of social preference profiles that result in intransitive social 
preference orders include many that would be inconsequential in a 
board election. 
Once we‘re past such general observations about the possibility 
of cycles, though, it is somewhat difficult to assess the nature of the 
inconsistency that gives rise to Easterbrook and Fischel‘s worries 
about expanding the corporate electorate. The inconsistency would 
ostensibly involve the choice of board candidates, which would need to 
be incompatible with some other outcome. But it is unclear what that 
other outcome is thought to be. It cannot be that we are worried about 
the actual choice of board members being inconsistent with the 
―correct‖ choice, because, of course, there is no such choice in this 
situation. Indeed, the main problem with a preference profile that 
produces a top cycle is that there is no single best social choice. 
Like many aspects of the argument from Arrow‘s theorem, it is 
difficult to understand what exactly its proponents are worried about. 
Because we are talking about preference consistency, it may be useful 
to divide the discussion into concerns about synchronic and diachronic 
consistency. Simply put, synchronic consistency involves having a 
preference ordering that fits together at a particular time, while 
diachronic consistency has to do with coherence over time. They are 
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related (synchronic inconsistency may result in diachronic 
inconsistency), and fear of one, the other, or both may be implicated 
here. 
Although worries about Arrovian intransitivities usually 
involve concerns about synchronic consistency (indeed, cycling is a 
form of synchronic inconsistency), it is difficult to see how those 
concerns alone could be behind this argument. The synchronic 
inconsistency in this situation would be that, at one time, a board 
electorate has preferences with respect to board candidates that give 
rise to an intransitive ordering. But a nascent intransitivity does not 
automatically translate into an unstable outcome, because there are 
many features to corporate (and political) elections that operate to 
produce stability. Initially, most corporate board voting procedures are 
structured to produce a winner regardless of the presence of lurking 
intransitivities. Board elections generally only require the vote of a 
plurality to win; as long as a director gets one vote, in some cases, she 
will win if unopposed.100 Some boards have staggered seats, in which 
directors have three-year terms, and only one-third of the directors are 
elected in any given year.101 In cases where there actually are top 
cycles, the candidate selected by the voting procedure may, indeed, be 
the contingent product of that process. But the voting procedures 
themselves, and the ―structure-induced‖ equilibria they produced,102 
would ensure that the firm would not suffer for lack of directors. And 
the other director candidates within the cycle have no greater claim to 
the position than the chosen member. 
The more plausible argument here is that a synchronic 
inconsistency could easily lead to diachronic inconsistency if the choice 
that resulted from a preference cycle was determined at random. This 
would mean that, in certain situations, we may have successive board 
elections with somewhat similar sets of candidates and end up with 
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different board members. These board members would, presumably, 
have different ideas about the best strategies for the firm, implement 
them, and thus cause the firm to lurch from one strategy to another. 
This type of diachronic inconsistency would also fit with the standard 
inconsistency complaint about firms: they change courses too often. 
But, even assuming the presence of a top cycle, this sort of 
diachronic inconsistency in choice of board members is unlikely to 
occur. The decision processes themselves may operate to produce 
stability across time.103 Once a decision is made, there are new actors 
and new interests involved; the same alternatives are rarely 
confronted twice. Indeed, in corporate elections, it is quite plausible 
that both voters and candidates would change from election to 
election. For example, voters for the ―losing‖ candidate in the first 
election—especially the shareholder voters, given their low exit 
costs—would probably not be around for the next election. The same 
can be said for the losing candidates themselves, further reducing the 
possibility of successive elections that produce intransitive outcomes. 
And if the first board makes certain decisions, the result is a fait 
accompli at the next election—even the opposition cannot undo it in a 
costless way. 
The ultimate worry here, though, appears to be that expanding 
the electorate will result in inconsistent firm decisions. But even in 
the rare case where successive board elections produce ―inconsistent‖ 
board members, they are not likely to result in inconsistent board 
decisions, much less ones that would cause a firm to self-destruct. For 
one, the board member would be only one of, say, eleven directors. In 
addition, even assuming a complete board turnover, the subsequent 
board members would presumably know the recent history of the 
firm‘s decisions, its current situation, and whether it is now in the 
firm‘s interest to change course. In other words, the board members 
would be able to exercise independent judgment as to whether their 
original plans for the firm still make sense in the current situation. 
(Indeed, Gordon claims that cycling at the board level is, for this and 
several other reasons, very unlikely.)104 Those who make the 
argument from Arrow‘s theorem never explain this move from 
inconsistent board elections to inconsistent corporate decisions, and it 
seems anything but obvious. 
The intransitivity concerns are even more out of place in the 
typical corporate election. Our discussion thus far has assumed a 
robust democracy in which many candidates compete for the right to 
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represent the voting populace. In most corporate elections, the board 
puts forth its proposed slate of candidates (which may be all 
incumbents), and the shareholders ratify those choices. This 
separation of ownership and control, in which shareholders ―own‖ and 
managers ―control,‖ has long been a foundation of corporate law—both 
in theory and practice.105 Consistency in corporate policy comes not 
from the uniformity and stability of voter preferences, but rather from 
a lack of responsiveness and from (economically rational) voter 
apathy. In fact, efforts to reinvigorate the shareholder franchise have 
only recently met with limited success. For this reason, a preference 
for a hypothetical shareholder franchise (as opposed to a more 
inclusive voting polity) seems out of touch with the modern reality of 
the impotence of the corporate franchise. 
The related worry that intransitivities in board elections would 
mean the election results could be manipulated is also not that 
compelling. If we were in one of those relatively rare situations where 
voter preferences may produce a cyclical outcome, we know that one 
may strategically manipulate the election process to achieve a desired 
outcome. But in order to do so, one must have a pretty good read on 
the set of voter preferences far enough in advance of the election to 
actually manipulate the process (by tinkering with the election process 
or the slate of candidates). In corporate board elections, the set of 
preferences is typically enormous, and the processes and candidates 
are usually set far enough in advance of the actual election to make 
such manipulation quite difficult.  
More to the point, current board members, who would 
presumably be in the best position to manipulate the agenda, would 
manipulate outcomes in a way that consistently favored their interests 
(which should allay the fear of inconsistent firm decisions).106 
Manipulation removes synchronic inconsistency, and consistent 
manipulation removes diachronic inconsistency. And to the extent 
that the fear of manipulation is independent of the fear of 
inconsistency, it is worth pointing out that a manipulated outcome 
would just be a fallback tiebreaker between top cycle alternatives—not 
the kind of thing likely to result in damaging corporate behavior. Of 
course, all of this should not be of much concern to those who favor 
some version of board primacy anyway, for this would allow the board 
to further solidify its own power. Thus, the potential for the 
 
 105. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–52 (1932). 
 106. For an empirical examination of the power of incumbent boards to influence elections, 
see Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159 (2008). 
ARROW ARTICLE 6/2/2009 10:01 AM 
200x] THE EXCLUSIVE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE 127 
manipulation of board member elections, like the possibility of 
inconsistent members over time, does not seem that worrisome. 
Proponents of the argument from Arrow‘s theorem have not 
connected the long series of points between a board election cycle and 
a self-destructive firm. There are many aspects to the voting process 
itself that produce stability in individual elections and across time. 
Inconsistent board member elections, if and when they do occur, would 
not normally be expected to produce inconsistent firm decisions, much 
less ones that would translate into the ―destruction‖ of the firm. In 
other words, one has to tell a fantastic story in order to move from a 
nascent intransitivity in a board election to a firm that makes self-
destructive choices, a story so fantastic that it is completely 
implausible. 
CONCLUSION 
The argument from Arrow‘s theorem for the present state of 
the corporate franchise is flawed at many levels. Shareholders do not 
have homogeneous interest in profit maximization. Even if they did, it 
would not directly translate into the kind of agreement on candidates 
necessary to avoid intransitive results in corporate elections. Further, 
even if shareholder homogeneity did translate into the requisite 
agreement on candidates, restricting voting rights to shareholders 
involves sacrificing a fundamental condition of democracy in a 
situation where the likelihood and impact of intransitive results is 
already negligible. This argument for restricting corporate voting 
rights to shareholders, then, is far from compelling. 
 
